On Strategic Complementarities In Discontinuous Games With Totally Ordered Strategies
Year:
2017Published in:
Mathematical EconomicsThis paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.
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