Working paper

Domain L-Majorization and Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Games

Year:

2010

Published in:

SSRN
Better-reply secure game
Discontinuous game
Single deviation property
Majorized correspondence
Qualitative game

We study the equilibrium existence problem in normal form and qualitative games in which it is possible to associate with each nonequilibrium point an open neighborhood and a collection of deviation strategies such that, at any nonequilibrium point of the neighborhood, a player can increase her payoff by switching to the deviation strategy designated for her. An equilibrium existence theorem for compact, quasiconcave games with two players is established. We propose a new form of the better-reply security condition, called the strong single deviation property, that covers games whose set of Nash equilibria is not necessarily closed. We introduce domain L-majorized correspondences and use them to study equilibrium existence in qualitative games.

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On Strategic Complementarities In Discontinuous Games With Totally Ordered Strategies

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On Monotone Approximate And Exact Equilibria Of An Asymmetric First‑Price Auction With Affiliated Private Information

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