Journal article

Repeated Games With Present-Biased Preferences

Year:

2008

Published in:

Economic Theory
Infinitely Repeated Games
Equilibrium Payoffs
Present-Time Bias

We study infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, where players have β–δ preferences. We compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques and then characterize equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the cost of the present-time bias, producing comparative statics. Unless the minimax outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the equilibrium payoff set is not monotonic in β or δ. Finally, we show how the equilibrium payoff set is contained in that of a repeated game with smaller discount factor.

Other publications by

16 publications found

2005
Working paper

Essays On Repeated Games

Publisher: University of Michigan ProQuest Dissertations & Theses

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych

2012
Journal article

The Single Deviation Property In Games With Discontinuous Payoffs

Publisher: Economic Theory

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych

2017
Journal article

On Strategic Complementarities In Discontinuous Games With Totally Ordered Strategies

Publisher: Mathematical Economics

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych, Nicholas C. Yannelis

2023
Journal article

On Monotone Pure‑Strategy Bayesian‑Nash Equilibria Of A Generalized Contest

Publisher: Games and Economic Behavior

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych

2022
Conference proceedings

Synthesis Of A Passive Unloading Orthosis With Mechanical Feedback

Publisher: International Scientific and Technical Conference “SOURCE OF TECHNOLOGIES OF BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING”

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych, Sofia Kovban, Polina Verbytska, Alisa Cherkashina, Ihor Sydorenko