Working paper

Correlation in Repeated Games with Public Monitoring

Year:

2010

Published in:

SSRN
Repeated Games
Extensive form correlation
Efficiency
Imperfect public monitoring
Perfect monitoring

This paper studies extensive-form correlation in discounted infinitely repeated games with public monitoring. We propose two extensions of Fudenberg et al.'s (Econometrica 62:997--1040, 1994) notion of a perfect public equilibrium: the notion of a perfect public correlated equilibrium for games in which a correlation device sends private correlated messages to the players at the beginning of each period and the notion of a perfect public augmented equilibrium for games in which the device also publicly informs the players of the recommended action profile at the end of each period. The set of perfect public correlated equilibrium payoffs is compared to the set of subgame perfect publicly correlated equilibrium payoffs in the perfect monitoring case. It is shown that augmented correlation produces efficiency gains in the repeated partnership game by Radner et al. (Rev Econ Stud 53:59-69, 1986).

Other publications by

16 publications found

2003
Working paper

Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games

Publisher: University of Michigan

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych, Lones Smith

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Synthesis Of A Passive Unloading Orthosis With Mechanical Feedback

Publisher: International Scientific and Technical Conference “SOURCE OF TECHNOLOGIES OF BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING”

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych, Sofia Kovban, Polina Verbytska, Alisa Cherkashina, Ihor Sydorenko

2009
Working paper

A Short Proof of Reny's Existence Theorem for Payoff Secure Games

Publisher: SSRN

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych

2012
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The Single Deviation Property In Games With Discontinuous Payoffs

Publisher: Economic Theory

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych

2010
Working paper

Domain L‑Majorization and Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Games

Publisher: SSRN

Authors: Pavlo Prokopovych