Electoral Effects Of Institutional Reforms: Evidence From Ukraine And Russia

This dissertation explores the impact of institutional reforms on electoral outcomes. My first substantive chapter investigates the question of how institutional reforms affect voter mobilization in weakly-institutionalized democracies. I examine the effect of decentralization on turnout and candidate diversity in local elections in Ukraine in 2015-2020. In 2014, the government of Ukraine initiated decentralization reform which allowed territorial communities to gain wider administrative, financial, and fiscal independence. Difference-in-differences estimates show that decentralization increased turnout and decreased the percentage of successful candidates with higher education and party affiliation. These effects can be explained by the increased interest in local politics and easier access to candidacy due to improved salience of local politics and communities’ relative independence from central authorities. Thus, even under weak democratic institutions, decentralization can have immediate effect on voter mobilization through increased perception of local elections as ’meaningful’ and, thus, worth time and effort.