Journal article

The Contribution of Veto Players to Economic Reform

Year:

2010

Published in:

The Journal of Politics
veto players
policy change
special interests
reform reversals
economic reform

Contrary to the conventional understanding that reform is more difficult when veto players are numerous, we show formally that veto players may encourage policy change by weakening the power of special interests that prefer inefficient reform outcomes. Using the same model, we demonstrate that reform reversals are less likely in the presence of multiple veto players, implying that a constitutional framework conducive to initial reforms may also lock in those achievements over time. We find support for our theoretical perspective in a study of the relationship between veto players and economic reform in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

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