Journal article

Constructing Meanings

Year:

2014

Published in:

Analysis

Authors:

two-dimensionalism
possible worlds
Fregean
content
cognitive significance

Chalmers’s philosophical work exploits a distinctive version of two-dimensionalism, a formal modal framework from the 1960s and 1970s that one can use to define two kinds of possible worlds semantic values. Chalmers presents this as the best form of a Fregean account of content. One of the principal aims of Constructing the World is to provide its metaphysical foundations. Chalmers presents himself as vindicating a Fregean account of meaning. I will be arguing that this is incorrect; the resulting theory of meaning is not properly regarded as Fregean, because it is not a plausible theory of cognitive significance How much this poses a problem for Chalmers depends upon whether his notion of content ultimately depends upon the Fregean theory of content, that is, the theory of content that does provide an account of cognitive significance.